elementary-data PyPI and GHCR GitHub Actions Compromise

Executive Summary

On April 24, 2026 at 22:20:47 UTC, a malicious elementary-data==0.23.3 release was uploaded to PyPI StepSecurity. The same release workflow also pushed a compromised multi-architecture container image to GitHub Container Registry at ghcr.io/elementary-data/elementary, including the 0.23.3 and latest tags StepSecurity.

The attacker exploited a script-injection vulnerability in an Elementary GitHub Actions workflow, used the workflow’s GITHUB_TOKEN to forge a release commit, and dispatched the legitimate publishing pipeline without modifying the master branch StepSecurity. The malicious wheel and source distribution added a top-level elementary.pth file, which Python executes at interpreter startup when installed in site-packages; this means the payload could run even if the victim never explicitly imported elementary StepSecurity.

Elementary’s incident report defines the affected window as 2026-04-24 22:10 UTC through 2026-04-25 09:45 UTC and says users who installed 0.23.3 or ran the affected container should assume credentials available to that environment were exposed Elementary. Snyk tracks the incident as SNYK-PYTHON-ELEMENTARYDATA-16316110, affecting only elementary-data==0.23.3; Elementary Cloud, the Elementary dbt package, and other CLI versions were not affected Snyk Vulnerability Database. The clean replacement is 0.23.4 PyPI.

Key Facts

Threat Type: GitHub Actions script injection, forged release, PyPI/GHCR credential stealer

Ecosystem: pypi, python, container

Registry:

• PyPI
• GitHub Container Registry

Affected Packages:

• elementary-data

Malicious Versions:

• 0.23.3

Fixed Versions:

• 0.23.4 and later

Known Good Versions:

• 0.23.2

Execution Trigger: Python interpreter startup through elementary.pth

Primary Impact: dbt, data warehouse, cloud, SSH, API token, environment variable, and developer secret theft

Known Iocs:

• elementary.pth
• ghcr.io/elementary-data/elementary:0.23.3
• ghcr.io/elementary-data/elementary:latest
• igotnofriendsonlineorirl-imgonnakmslmao[.]skyhanni[.]cloud
• X-Rise-To-The-Trinny: agree
• trin[.]tar[.]gz
• /tmp/.trinny-security-update
• %TEMP%.trinny-security-update

Confidence: high

Canonical Source: https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/elementary-data-compromised-on-pypi-and-ghcr-forged-release-pushed-via-github-actions-script-injection

Affected Window: 2026-04-24T22:10:00Z/2026-04-25T09:45:00Z

Last Verified: 2026-06-10

Evidence Assessment

• confirmed: elementary-data==0.23.3 was the malicious PyPI release; 0.23.4 is the clean replacement StepSecurity PyPI.
• confirmed: The malicious release added elementary.pth, which executes at Python interpreter startup from site-packages StepSecurity.
• confirmed: The incident also affected GHCR images tagged 0.23.3 and latest, with the clean 0.23.2 image available by digest for comparison StepSecurity.
• confirmed: Snyk identifies the payload as an embedded credential stealer targeting dbt profiles, data warehouse credentials, cloud keys, API tokens, SSH keys, .env files, and environment variables Snyk Vulnerability Database.
• confirmed: Elementary states the affected window, exact response timeline, marker paths, credential-rotation scope, and that only CLI version 0.23.3 and the corresponding container were affected Elementary.
• confirmed registry state: PyPI no longer exposes 0.23.3; clean 0.23.4 artifacts were uploaded at 11:48 UTC on April 25 with SHA-256 values fe52712660fef56586d954e50f81ccc7b96ed2809b5e930c7b9d032e7ab03b8d and 5cf8f4c3fa0b7e84cb0096c94eb9af941ea632c9acffa002d0db3b3c1d9ef97e PyPI.
• unclear: The public sources do not identify the threat actor or confirm whether any stolen credentials were used after exfiltration.

Impact Determination

Classification	Criteria	Required evidence	Required action	Closure condition
Confirmed compromise	elementary-data==0.23.3 or the compromised GHCR image is present and Python startup executes elementary.pth or the reported process, file, or network indicators is observed.	Artifact inventory plus runtime telemetry showing Python startup executes elementary.pth or listed C2/process/file indicators.	Isolate affected hosts or runners, preserve artifacts, and rotate reachable credentials from a clean environment.	Affected artifacts are removed, exposed credentials are replaced, and downstream audit modules show no suspicious follow-on use.
Presumed exposed	elementary-data==0.23.3 or the compromised GHCR image was installed, pulled, imported, built, or executed during the exposure window, but telemetry cannot prove exfiltration.	Lockfile, package cache, workflow, image pull, extension inventory, build log, or deployment record tied to the exposure window.	Rebuild from clean artifacts and rotate credentials available to the affected environment.	Credential owners confirm revocation of old material and clean artifacts are deployed.
Potentially exposed	The package, workflow, image, extension, or module appears in dependency or deployment records, but Python install, import, or interpreter-startup execution is not established.	Manifest, lockfile, build, deployment, or endpoint records plus a named telemetry gap.	Collect the missing execution and telemetry evidence before narrowing scope.	Every hit is dispositioned as confirmed compromise, presumed exposed, or not exposed.
Not exposed	No affected version, artifact, mutable reference, or indicator appears in source, lockfiles, build outputs, deployments, package caches, or runtime telemetry.	Repository search, dependency inventory, build/deployment export, package cache query, and runtime telemetry query results.	Preserve the negative search output and keep the prevention controls active.	Search evidence covers developer endpoints, CI runners, production deployments, and package or image caches.
Unknown	Required inventory, build, endpoint, network, or audit telemetry is unavailable.	A gap statement naming unavailable systems, owners, and time windows.	Keep the asset in scope and make conservative rotation or rebuild decisions for high-value environments.	The missing evidence is recovered or the risk owner accepts residual uncertainty.

Minimum Evidence To Collect

Minimum Evidence:

• Dependency, workflow, extension, image, or module inventory covering developer endpoints, CI runners, and production deployments.
• Positive or negative search results for elementary-data==0.23.3, ghcr.io/elementary-data/elementary:0.23.3, ghcr.io/elementary-data/elementary:latest.
• Execution evidence for Python startup processing elementary.pth, or the marker /tmp/.trinny-security-update or %TEMP%\.trinny-security-update.
• Process, file, DNS, proxy, firewall, or package-manager telemetry for listed indicators.
• Inventory of credentials, tokens, deployment paths, and downstream systems reachable from exposed environments.

Timeline

• 2026-04-24T22:10:00Z: A crafted pull-request comment triggers the vulnerable workflow Elementary.
• 2026-04-24T22:20:47Z: elementary-data==0.23.3 is uploaded to PyPI with a malicious top-level elementary.pth file Elementary StepSecurity.
• 2026-04-24T22:24:00Z: The compromised container image is pushed to GHCR Elementary.
• 2026-04-25T06:18:26Z: GitHub issue #2205 reports the malicious release GitHub.
• 2026-04-25T08:51:00Z-11:51:00Z: Elementary removes affected artifacts and workflows, rotates credentials, and publishes clean 0.23.4 Elementary.
• 2026-04-27: Elementary publishes its incident report; Snyk publishes its technical analysis and advisory Elementary Snyk.

What Happened

The attacker did not need to land a conventional malicious pull request on the default branch. Instead, they abused a script-injection weakness in a GitHub Actions workflow and used the workflow’s own token to forge a release commit that looked signed by automation StepSecurity. The release tag pointed to an orphaned commit that bumped the version to 0.23.3 and added elementary.pth, rather than a normal branch commit reviewed through the project workflow StepSecurity.

Because .pth files are evaluated by Python at interpreter startup, the malicious code could execute in any environment where the package was installed, independent of application-level imports StepSecurity. The same release run produced a compromised container image, expanding the blast radius to teams pulling ghcr.io/elementary-data/elementary:latest in data engineering deployments StepSecurity.

Technical Analysis

Initial Access

Initial access came through a GitHub Actions script-injection vector, not through a direct commit to master StepSecurity. The key failure was allowing attacker-influenced workflow input to execute with a token capable of causing release publication.

Package or Artifact Manipulation

The malicious delta was narrow: a version bump plus a single top-level elementary.pth file containing a large base64-wrapped payload StepSecurity. That small source delta belied a serious runtime impact because .pth execution happens automatically at interpreter startup.

Payload Behavior

Snyk reports that the malware harvested dbt profiles, Snowflake, BigQuery, Redshift, AWS, GCP, Azure, API token, SSH key, .env, and active environment variable secrets Snyk Vulnerability Database. StepSecurity lists the C2/exfiltration domain as igotnofriendsonlineorirl-imgonnakmslmao.skyhanni.cloud, the exfiltration header as X-Rise-To-The-Trinny: agree, and the staged archive as trin.tar.gz StepSecurity. [1]

Affected Assets and Blast Radius

Affected Assets:

• ecosystems: PyPI,Python
• registries: pypi.org
• packages: elementary-data
• versions: elementary-data==0.23.3,ghcr.io/elementary-data/elementary:0.23.3,ghcr.io/elementary-data/elementary:latest
• repositories: elementary-data/elementary
• ci_cd_systems: GitHub Actions
• container_images: ghcr.io/elementary-data/elementary:0.23.3,ghcr.io/elementary-data/elementary:latest
• developer_tools: dbt,data engineering CLI environments

Credentials At Risk:

• dbt profiles
• data warehouse credentials
• cloud credentials
• API tokens
• SSH keys
• CI/CD secrets
• Docker credentials
• Kubernetes credentials

Downstream Systems To Audit:

• source control
• package registries
• cloud control planes
• deployment platforms
• Kubernetes or containers
• secret managers

Not Currently Known To Affect:

• Assets without the affected artifact and without execution evidence.

Indicators of Compromise

The following indicators of compromise (IOCs) can be used to scope exposure across local repositories, systems, and telemetry exports:

Package Versions

• 0.23.3
• elementary-data==0.23.3
• ghcr.io/elementary-data/elementary:0.23.3
• ghcr.io/elementary-data/elementary:latest

Files

• elementary.pth
• trin[.]tar[.]gz
• /tmp/.trinny-security-update
• %TEMP%\.trinny-security-update

Hashes

• sha256:31ecc5939de6d24cf60c50d4ca26cf7a8c322db82a8ce4bd122ebd89cf634255
• sha256:b3bbfafde1a0db3a4d47e70eb0eb2ca19daef4a19410154a71abee567b35d3d9
• sha256:fe52712660fef56586d954e50f81ccc7b96ed2809b5e930c7b9d032e7ab03b8d
• sha256:5cf8f4c3fa0b7e84cb0096c94eb9af941ea632c9acffa002d0db3b3c1d9ef97e
• 31ecc5939de6d24cf60c50d4ca26cf7a8c322db82a8ce4bd122ebd89cf634255
• b3bbfafde1a0db3a4d47e70eb0eb2ca19daef4a19410154a71abee567b35d3d9
• fe52712660fef56586d954e50f81ccc7b96ed2809b5e930c7b9d032e7ab03b8d
• 5cf8f4c3fa0b7e84cb0096c94eb9af941ea632c9acffa002d0db3b3c1d9ef97e

Domains

• igotnofriendsonlineorirl-imgonnakmslmao[.]skyhanni[.]cloud
• trin[.]tar[.]gz

Process Patterns

• Python startup executes elementary.pth

Network Patterns

• egress related to elementary-data 0.23.3 package or GHCR image

Detection and Hunting

Hunt Manifest: elementary-data-pypi-ghcr-compromise-hunt-1

• Title: local repository and exported telemetry scope
• Question: Does the telemetry scope contain patterns associated with elementary-data PyPI and GHCR GitHub Actions Compromise?
• Telemetry Family: process
• Telemetry Context: host filesystem or log export
• Positive Signal: Indicators of compromise matched in telemetry: local repository and exported telemetry scope

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import os
import sys
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path

ROOT = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "."
LOG_ROOT = os.environ.get("LOG_ROOT", "")
OUT = Path(os.environ.get("OUT", "hp-elementary-data-pypi-ghcr-compromise-scope"))

DOMAINS = ["ghcr.io","elementary.pth","igotnofriendsonlineorirl-imgonnakmslmao.skyhanni.cloud"]
HASHES = ["31ecc5939de6d24cf60c50d4ca26cf7a8c322db82a8ce4bd122ebd89cf634255","b3bbfafde1a0db3a4d47e70eb0eb2ca19daef4a19410154a71abee567b35d3d9","fe52712660fef56586d954e50f81ccc7b96ed2809b5e930c7b9d032e7ab03b8d","5cf8f4c3fa0b7e84cb0096c94eb9af941ea632c9acffa002d0db3b3c1d9ef97e"]

# Collect unique indicators
indicators = set()
for group in [DOMAINS, HASHES]:
    for val in group:
        if val:
            indicators.add(val)

with open(indicators_file, "w") as f:
    for ind in sorted(indicators):
        f.write(ind + "\n")

print(f"[+] Written unique selectors to {indicators_file}")

# Walk local directory
print(f"[+] Scanning directory: {ROOT} for selectors...")
matches = []
exclude_dirs = {"node_modules", "vendor", "dist", ".git"}
for root, dirs, filenames in os.walk(ROOT):
    dirs[:] = [d for d in dirs if d not in exclude_dirs]
    for filename in filenames:
        filepath = Path(root) / filename
        try:
            content = filepath.read_text(errors="ignore")
            for ind in indicators:
                if ind in content:
                    matches.append(f"{filepath}: found '{ind}'")
        except Exception:
            pass  # pass # return or raise not needed here  # pass # return or raise not needed here

if matches:
    (OUT / "repository-indicator-matches.txt").write_text("\n".join(matches) + "\n")
    print(f"[!] Found {len(matches)} matches in codebase!")

# Optional Log Scanning
if LOG_ROOT and os.path.exists(LOG_ROOT):
    print(f"[+] Scanning telemetry log directory: {LOG_ROOT}...")
    log_matches = []
    for root, _, filenames in os.walk(LOG_ROOT):
        for filename in filenames:
            filepath = Path(root) / filename
            try:
                content = filepath.read_text(errors="ignore")
                for ind in indicators:
                    if ind in content:
                        log_matches.append(f"{filepath}: found '{ind}'")
            except Exception:
                pass  # pass # return or raise not needed here  # pass # return or raise not needed here
    if log_matches:
        (OUT / "exported-telemetry-indicator-matches.txt").write_text("\n".join(log_matches) + "\n")
        print(f"[!] Found {len(log_matches)} matches in logs!")

    if PACKAGES:
        registry_dir = OUT / "registry"
        registry_dir.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
        for package in PACKAGES:
            if not package: continue
            safe_name = package.replace("/", "__")
            print(f"[+] Querying pip index for {package}...")
            res = subprocess.run(["python3", "-m", "pip", "index", "versions", package], capture_output=True, text=True)
            if res.returncode == 0:
                (registry_dir / f"pypi-{safe_name}-versions.txt").write_text(res.stdout)
            subprocess.run(["python3", "-m", "pip", "download", "--no-deps", package, "-d", str(registry_dir)], capture_output=True)

print(f"[+] Wrote scope artifacts under {OUT}")

Downstream Abuse Audits

Compromised workstations expose active API credentials, requiring immediate rotated revocation. The following platforms are at risk:

• GitHub OIDC and PATs: Attackers harvested SSH private keys and Git Personal Access Tokens. Auditors must inspect recent action runs and release logs during the exposure window.
• Cloud IAM Credentials: AWS, Azure, and GCP session tokens. CloudTrail and Activity Logs should be queried for AssumeRole or write operations originating from unexpected IP addresses.
• NPM and Package Registries: Publishing tokens and credentials. Registry profiles must be audited for unauthorized version publishes or token additions.

Sources

1. StepSecurity: elementary-data Compromised on PyPI and GHCR - Role: PRIMARY_RESEARCH - Impact: Timeline, attack path, .pth execution, GHCR digest, C2 indicators.
2. Snyk Vulnerability Database: SNYK-PYTHON-ELEMENTARYDATA-16316110 - Role: ENRICHMENT_DATA - Impact: Advisory ID, affected version, severity, credential classes.
3. Snyk: Malicious Release of elementary-data PyPI Package - Role: PRIMARY_RESEARCH - Impact: Data engineering target profile and remediation context.
4. PyPI project page: elementary-data - Role: DIRECT_SOURCE - Impact: Clean replacement release evidence.
5. Elementary GitHub issue #2205 - Role: DIRECT_SOURCE - Impact: Original community report and discovery timestamp.
6. Elementary: Security Incident Report for CLI v0.23.3 - Role: VENDOR_INCIDENT_REPORT - Impact: Authoritative exposure window, response timeline, affected scope, marker paths, and remediation.