TrapDoor Cross-Ecosystem Crypto Stealer Campaign

Executive Summary

TrapDoor is an active software supply-chain campaign reported by Socket on May 24, 2026, spanning npm, PyPI, and Crates.io packages aimed at crypto, DeFi, AI, and developer-security workflows Socket. Socket tracks more than 34 malicious packages and 384 or more related versions/artifacts, while OSV already lists several PyPI malicious-package records tied to the same 2026-05-eth-security-auditor campaign Socket OSV PyPI list.

The campaign is notable because each ecosystem gets a native execution path: npm postinstall hooks, PyPI import-time loaders that execute remote JavaScript, and Rust build.rs scripts that run during compilation Socket. The payloads target SSH keys, GitHub tokens, AWS and cloud credentials, browser data, environment variables, crypto wallet material, and AI assistant instruction surfaces such as .cursorrules and CLAUDE.md Socket GitHub repo.

Key Facts

Threat Type: cross-registry malicious package campaign

Ecosystem: npm, PyPI, Crates.io

Registry: npmjs.com, pypi.org, crates.io

Affected Packages:

• npm: async-pipeline-builder,build-scripts-utils,chain-key-validator,crypto-credential-scanner,defi-env-auditor,defi-threat-scanner,deployment-key-auditor,dev-env-bootstrapper,eth-wallet-sentinel,llm-context-compressor,mnemonic-safety-check,model-switch-router,node-setup-helpers,project-init-tools,prompt-engineering-toolkit,solidity-deploy-guard,token-usage-tracker,wallet-backup-verifier,wallet-security-checker,web3-secrets-detector,workspace-config-loader
• pypi: cryptowallet-safety,data-pipeline-check,defi-risk-scanner,env-loader-cli,eth-security-auditor,git-config-sync,solidity-build-guard
• crates: move-analyzer-build,move-compiler-tools,move-project-builder,sui-framework-helpers,sui-move-build-helper,sui-sdk-build-utils

Malicious Versions:

• env-loader-cli@0.1.0
• env-loader-cli@0.1.1
• eth-security-auditor@0.1.0
• sui-framework-helpers@0.1.0

Known Good Versions:

Fixed Or Safe Versions:

Execution Trigger: npm postinstall, Python import, Rust build.rs

Primary Impact: developer secret theft, cloud credential theft, SSH lateral movement, crypto wallet theft, AI assistant instruction poisoning

Campaign Context: active cross-ecosystem campaign tracked by Socket as TrapDoor

Confidence: medium

Canonical Source: https://socket.dev/blog/trapdoor-crypto-stealer-npm-pypi-crates

Last Verified: 2026-05-24

Evidence Assessment

• confirmed: Socket reports TrapDoor as a cross-ecosystem campaign across npm, PyPI, and Crates.io, with 34+ malicious packages and 384+ related versions/artifacts Socket.
• confirmed: OSV lists recent malicious PyPI package records for env-loader-cli, data-pipeline-check, git-config-sync, defi-risk-scanner, cryptowallet-safety, solidity-build-guard, and eth-security-auditor OSV PyPI list.
• confirmed: OSV record MAL-2026-4272 says env-loader-cli runs code during import to exfiltrate credentials, private keys, and sensitive data, and it lists affected versions 0.1.0 and 0.1.1 OSV MAL-2026-4272.
• confirmed: The attacker-controlled GitHub repository ddjidd564/defi-security-best-practices exists on the gh-pages branch and exposes directories and files matching Socket’s infrastructure reporting, including payloads, trap-core, .cursorrules, and CLAUDE.md GitHub repo.
• likely: The campaign scope will continue to change because Socket describes the activity as active and says some packages were already removed while others were still live at publication time Socket.
• unclear: No public source reviewed here proves real-world victim count, complete registry removal status, or actor attribution beyond the observed GitHub account and package publishers.

Impact Determination

Classification	Criteria	Required evidence	Required action	Closure condition
Confirmed compromise	a TrapDoor npm, PyPI, or Crates.io package is present and npm postinstall, Python import-time loader, or Rust build.rs executes or the reported process, file, or network indicators is observed.	Artifact inventory plus runtime telemetry showing npm postinstall, Python import-time loader, or Rust build.rs executes or listed C2/process/file indicators.	Isolate affected hosts or runners, preserve artifacts, and rotate reachable credentials from a clean environment.	Affected artifacts are removed, exposed credentials are replaced, and downstream audit modules show no suspicious follow-on use.
Presumed exposed	a TrapDoor npm, PyPI, or Crates.io package was installed, pulled, imported, built, or executed during the exposure window, but telemetry cannot prove exfiltration.	Lockfile, package cache, workflow, image pull, extension inventory, build log, or deployment record tied to the exposure window.	Rebuild from clean artifacts and rotate credentials available to the affected environment.	Credential owners confirm revocation of old material and clean artifacts are deployed.
Potentially exposed	The package, workflow, image, extension, or module appears in dependency or deployment records, but package install, import, or build execution is not established.	Manifest, lockfile, build, deployment, or endpoint records plus a named telemetry gap.	Collect the missing execution and telemetry evidence before narrowing scope.	Every hit is dispositioned as confirmed compromise, presumed exposed, or not exposed.
Not exposed	No affected version, artifact, mutable reference, or indicator appears in source, lockfiles, build outputs, deployments, package caches, or runtime telemetry.	Repository search, dependency inventory, build/deployment export, package cache query, and runtime telemetry query results.	Preserve the negative search output and keep the prevention controls active.	Search evidence covers developer endpoints, CI runners, production deployments, and package or image caches.
Unknown	Required inventory, build, endpoint, network, or audit telemetry is unavailable.	A gap statement naming unavailable systems, owners, and time windows.	Keep the asset in scope and make conservative rotation or rebuild decisions for high-value environments.	The missing evidence is recovered or the risk owner accepts residual uncertainty.

Minimum Evidence To Collect

Minimum Evidence:

• Dependency, workflow, extension, image, or module inventory covering developer endpoints, CI runners, and production deployments.
• Positive or negative search results for env-loader-cli 0.1.0, env-loader-cli 0.1.1, eth-security-auditor 0.1.0, sui-framework-helpers 0.1.0.
• Execution evidence for npm postinstall, Python import-time loader, or Rust build.rs executes.
• Process, file, DNS, proxy, firewall, or package-manager telemetry for listed indicators.
• Inventory of credentials, tokens, deployment paths, and downstream systems reachable from exposed environments.

Timeline

• 2026-05-22T20:20:18Z Socket’s earliest observed package, eth-security-auditor@0.1.0, is uploaded to PyPI Socket.
• 2026-05-22T20:22:04Z Socket reports the eth-security-auditor wheel publication time Socket.
• 2026-05-24T05:42:09Z OSV publishes MAL-2026-4272 for env-loader-cli OSV MAL-2026-4272.
• 2026-05-24 Socket publishes public TrapDoor campaign research Socket.
• 2026-05-24 This local feed check found no existing Halting Problems coverage for TrapDoor, ddjidd564, eth-security-auditor, env-loader-cli, sui-framework-helpers, trap-core.js, or ddjidd564.github.io.

What Happened

Attackers published packages with benign-sounding names that map to high-value developer workflows: wallet checking, DeFi risk scanning, Solidity deployment validation, model routing, prompt engineering, environment bootstrapping, and Sui/Move build helpers Socket. That naming strategy matters because developers in crypto, AI, and security tooling are more likely to have valuable SSH keys, cloud tokens, GitHub credentials, and wallet files on the same machines where package installation happens.

The campaign does not rely on one registry-specific trick. Socket reports npm postinstall execution, PyPI import-time execution that downloads JavaScript from attacker-controlled GitHub Pages and runs it with node -e, and Crates.io build.rs execution during Rust compilation Socket. OSV corroborates the PyPI side for env-loader-cli, stating that the package executes during import and exfiltrates credentials, private keys, and sensitive data OSV MAL-2026-4272.

Technical Analysis

Initial Access

The known initial access vector is package publication to public registries rather than compromise of an established upstream project. Socket lists packages across npm, PyPI, and Crates.io, and OSV confirms malicious PyPI package entries associated with campaign 2026-05-eth-security-auditor Socket OSV MAL-2026-4272.

Package or Artifact Tampering

The artifacts are malicious packages, not just vulnerable packages. Socket identifies shared infrastructure and behavior across package names, including trap-core.js, campaign marker P-2024-001, GitHub Pages content under ddjidd564[.]github[.]io/defi-security-best-practices/, and attacker-owned repositories and pull requests Socket. The GitHub repository itself shows a broad payload and lure surface, including payloads, trap-core, .cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, PAYLOAD.md, and multiple security-themed directories GitHub repo.

Execution Trigger

npm packages use lifecycle execution after installation, PyPI packages execute during import and invoke remote JavaScript, and Crates.io packages use Rust build scripts Socket. The Rust side is especially relevant because build.rs executes during compilation, before a developer directly runs package functionality; docs.rs shows a source listing with build.rs for sui-framework-helpers 0.1.0 docs.rs.

Payload Behavior

Socket reports that TrapDoor steals SSH keys, Sui/Solana/Aptos wallet data, AWS credentials, GitHub tokens, browser data, crypto wallet extension data, environment variables, API keys, and local development configuration files Socket. The npm payload validates stolen AWS and GitHub credentials and attempts SSH-based lateral movement, which makes developer workstations and CI runners potential bridges into broader infrastructure Socket.

Exfiltration / C2

The durable network indicator is ddjidd564[.]github[.]io, especially paths under hxxps://ddjidd564[.]github[.]io/defi-security-best-practices/ Socket OSV MAL-2026-4272. OSV lists config.json, payloads/compliance-scanner-light.js, and payloads/risk-profiler.js under that path for env-loader-cli OSV MAL-2026-4272.

Propagation

Socket reports SSH-based propagation attempts and attacker pull requests that tried to add .cursorrules or CLAUDE.md files to AI and developer-tooling projects Socket. This makes TrapDoor broader than ordinary credential theft: the campaign also experiments with developer-assistant instruction surfaces as a persistence and social engineering layer.

Obfuscation or Evasion

The main evasion layer is workflow disguise. The packages present themselves as wallet safety tools, security scanners, build helpers, and AI/developer utilities Socket. Socket also reports zero-width Unicode in AI-facing files, Fernet and ECDH encryption in npm payloads, and XOR encryption with key cargo-build-helper-2026 in Crates.io packages Socket.

Campaign Execution Flow

The following sequence diagram maps the execution flow of the TrapDoor campaign across npm, PyPI, and Crates.io registries, highlighting the harvesting, lateral movement, and exfiltration vectors: [1]

sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    actor Dev as Developer / CI Runner
    participant Registry as Registry (npm/PyPI/Crates)
    participant AttackerGit as Attacker GitHub Pages<br/>(ddjidd564.github.io)
    participant LocalSys as Local Workstation / Runner
    participant Exfil as Exfiltration C2

    Note over Dev, Registry: 1. Initial Compromise Vector
    Dev->>Registry: Installs or imports malicious package
    Registry->>LocalSys: Delivers compromised package artifacts

    alt npm installation (postinstall lifecycle)
        LocalSys->>LocalSys: Trigger postinstall script hook (trap-core.js)
    else PyPI Import-time execution
        LocalSys->>LocalSys: python -c "import eth-security-auditor" executes
        LocalSys->>AttackerGit: Fetch payloads/compliance-scanner-light.js
        AttackerGit-->>LocalSys: Return remote JavaScript payload
        LocalSys->>LocalSys: Spawn 'node -e' to run remote JavaScript payload
    else Crates.io cargo build
        LocalSys->>LocalSys: cargo build triggers build.rs script execution
        LocalSys->>LocalSys: XOR decryption with cargo-build-helper-2026 key
    end

    Note over LocalSys: 2. Secret Harvesting Phase
    LocalSys->>LocalSys: Extract SSH keys (~/.ssh/*)
    LocalSys->>LocalSys: Collect Cloud Credentials (AWS, Azure, GCP)
    LocalSys->>LocalSys: Extract Solana/Aptos wallet keys & browser data
    LocalSys->>LocalSys: Scan workspace (.cursorrules, CLAUDE.md)

    Note over LocalSys: 3. Lateral Movement & Egress
    LocalSys->>Exfil: Exfiltrate ZIP archive with stolen credentials [1]
    LocalSys->>LocalSys: Attempt SSH connection to local network neighbors

Affected Assets and Blast Radius

Affected Assets:

• ecosystems: npm,PyPI,Crates.io
• packages: async-pipeline-builder,build-scripts-utils,chain-key-validator,crypto-credential-scanner,defi-env-auditor,defi-threat-scanner,deployment-key-auditor,dev-env-bootstrapper,eth-wallet-sentinel,llm-context-compressor,mnemonic-safety-check,model-switch-router,node-setup-helpers,project-init-tools,prompt-engineering-toolkit,solidity-deploy-guard,token-usage-tracker,wallet-backup-verifier,wallet-security-checker,web3-secrets-detector,workspace-config-loader,cryptowallet-safety,data-pipeline-check,defi-risk-scanner,env-loader-cli,eth-security-auditor,git-config-sync,solidity-build-guard,move-analyzer-build,move-compiler-tools,move-project-builder,sui-framework-helpers,sui-move-build-helper,sui-sdk-build-utils
• versions: env-loader-cli 0.1.0,env-loader-cli 0.1.1,eth-security-auditor 0.1.0,sui-framework-helpers 0.1.0
• repositories: github.com/ddjidd564/defi-security-best-practices
• ci_cd_systems: developer CI runners,GitHub Actions,GitLab CI,CircleCI,Travis CI
• container_images:
• developer_tools: Cursor,Claude Code style CLAUDE.md workflows,Rust cargo build,Python import workflows,npm install workflows

Credentials At Risk:

• SSH private keys
• GitHub tokens
• AWS credentials
• cloud credentials
• browser profile data
• crypto wallet data
• environment variables
• API keys

Not Currently Known To Affect:

• official Laravel framework packages
• established upstream projects unless they accepted malicious PRs or installed listed packages

Indicators of Compromise

The following indicators of compromise (IOCs) can be used to scope exposure across local repositories, systems, and telemetry exports:

Package Versions

• env-loader-cli@0.1.0
• env-loader-cli@0.1.1
• eth-security-auditor@0.1.0
• sui-framework-helpers@0.1.0
• PyPI/env-loader-cli 0.1.0
• PyPI/env-loader-cli 0.1.1
• PyPI/eth-security-auditor 0.1.0
• Crates.io/sui-framework-helpers 0.1.0

Files

• trap-core.js
• .cursorrules
• CLAUDE.md
• build.rs

Domains

• ddjidd564[.]github[.]io

Urls

• hxxps://ddjidd564[.]github[.]io/defi-security-best-practices/
• hxxps://ddjidd564[.]github[.]io/defi-security-best-practices/config[.]json
• hxxps://ddjidd564[.]github[.]io/defi-security-best-practices/payloads/compliance-scanner-light[.]js
• hxxps://ddjidd564[.]github[.]io/defi-security-best-practices/payloads/risk-profiler[.]js

Process Patterns

• npm -> node trap-core.js
• python -> node -e
• cargo -> build.rs

Network Patterns

• developer or CI host egress to ddjidd564.github.io
• post-install GitHub or AWS credential validation

Detection and Hunting

Hunt Manifest: trapdoor-cross-ecosystem-crypto-stealer-hunt-1

• Title: local repository and exported telemetry scope
• Question: Does the telemetry scope contain patterns associated with TrapDoor Cross-Ecosystem Crypto Stealer Campaign?
• Telemetry Family: process
• Telemetry Context: host filesystem or log export
• Positive Signal: Indicators of compromise matched in telemetry: local repository and exported telemetry scope

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Generic IOC scope scanner for trapdoor-cross-ecosystem-crypto-stealer.

Searches repository trees and exported logs for literal IOC values from iocs.json.
Exit codes:
  0: no matches
  1: one or more indicators matched
  2: execution error
"""
import argparse
import fnmatch
import os
import sys
from pathlib import Path

OUT = Path(os.environ.get("OUT", "hp-trapdoor-cross-ecosystem-crypto-stealer-ioc-scope"))
CONTENT_INDICATORS = [
  "env-loader-cli@0.1.0",
  "env-loader-cli@0.1.1",
  "eth-security-auditor@0.1.0",
  "sui-framework-helpers@0.1.0",
  "PyPI/env-loader-cli 0.1.0",
  "PyPI/env-loader-cli 0.1.1",
  "PyPI/eth-security-auditor 0.1.0",
  "Crates.io/sui-framework-helpers 0.1.0",
  "async-pipeline-builder@1.0.0",
  "build-scripts-utils@1.0.0",
  "chain-key-validator@1.0.0",
  "crypto-credential-scanner@1.0.0",
  "defi-env-auditor@1.0.0",
  "defi-threat-scanner@1.0.0",
  "deployment-key-auditor@1.0.0",
  "dev-env-bootstrapper@1.0.0",
  "eth-wallet-sentinel@1.0.0",
  "llm-context-compressor@1.0.0",
  "mnemonic-safety-check@1.0.0",
  "model-switch-router@1.0.0",
  "node-setup-helpers@1.0.0",
  "project-init-tools@1.0.0",
  "prompt-engineering-toolkit@1.0.0",
  "solidity-deploy-guard@1.0.0",
  "token-usage-tracker@1.0.0",
  "wallet-backup-verifier@1.0.0",
  "wallet-security-checker@1.0.0",
  "web3-secrets-detector@1.0.0",
  "workspace-config-loader@1.0.0",
  "cryptowallet-safety@1.0.0",
  "data-pipeline-check@1.0.0",
  "defi-risk-scanner@1.0.0",
  "git-config-sync@1.0.0",
  "solidity-build-guard@1.0.0",
  "move-analyzer-build@1.0.0",
  "move-compiler-tools@1.0.0",
  "move-project-builder@1.0.0",
  "sui-move-build-helper@1.0.0",
  "sui-sdk-build-utils@1.0.0",
  "ddjidd564.github.io",
  "https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/",
  "https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/config.json",
  "https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/payloads/compliance-scanner-light.js",
  "https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/payloads/risk-profiler.js",
  "npm -> node trap-core.js",
  "python -> node -e",
  "cargo -> build.rs",
  "developer or CI host egress to ddjidd564.github.io",
  "post-install GitHub or AWS credential validation",
  "env-loader-cli",
  "0.1.0",
  "0.1.1",
  "eth-security-auditor",
  "sui-framework-helpers",
  "PyPI/env-loader-cli",
  "PyPI/eth-security-auditor",
  "Crates.io/sui-framework-helpers",
  "async-pipeline-builder",
  "1.0.0",
  "build-scripts-utils",
  "chain-key-validator",
  "crypto-credential-scanner",
  "defi-env-auditor",
  "defi-threat-scanner",
  "deployment-key-auditor",
  "dev-env-bootstrapper",
  "eth-wallet-sentinel",
  "llm-context-compressor",
  "mnemonic-safety-check",
  "model-switch-router",
  "node-setup-helpers",
  "project-init-tools",
  "prompt-engineering-toolkit",
  "solidity-deploy-guard",
  "token-usage-tracker",
  "wallet-backup-verifier",
  "wallet-security-checker",
  "web3-secrets-detector",
  "workspace-config-loader",
  "cryptowallet-safety",
  "data-pipeline-check",
  "defi-risk-scanner",
  "git-config-sync",
  "solidity-build-guard",
  "move-analyzer-build",
  "move-compiler-tools",
  "move-project-builder",
  "sui-move-build-helper",
  "sui-sdk-build-utils"
]
PATH_INDICATORS = [
  "trap-core.js",
  ".cursorrules",
  "CLAUDE.md",
  "build.rs"
]
EXCLUDE_DIRS = {".git", "node_modules", "vendor", "dist", "build", ".venv", "__pycache__"}

def _iter_files(root):
    root = Path(root)
    if not root.exists():
        return
    if root.is_file():
        yield root
        return
    for current, dirs, files in os.walk(root):
        dirs[:] = [d for d in dirs if d not in EXCLUDE_DIRS]
        for name in files:
            yield Path(current) / name

def _path_matches(path):
    text = str(path)
    matches = []
    for indicator in PATH_INDICATORS:
        if not indicator:
            continue
        if indicator.startswith(("/", "~")):
            candidate = Path(os.path.expanduser(indicator))
            if candidate.exists() and path == candidate:
                matches.append(indicator)
        if indicator in text or fnmatch.fnmatch(text, indicator) or fnmatch.fnmatch(path.name, indicator):
            matches.append(indicator)
    return matches

def _content_matches(path):
    try:
        content = path.read_text(errors="ignore")
    except Exception:
        return []
    return [indicator for indicator in CONTENT_INDICATORS if indicator and indicator in content]

def _scan_roots(roots):
    matches = []
    for root in roots:
        if not root:
            continue
        for path in _iter_files(root):
            for indicator in _path_matches(path):
                matches.append(f"{path}: path matched {indicator!r}")
            for indicator in _content_matches(path):
                matches.append(f"{path}: content matched {indicator!r}")
    return matches

def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Scan files and logs for Halting Problems IOC values")
    parser.add_argument("roots", nargs="*", default=["."], help="File or directory roots to scan")
    parser.add_argument("--log-root", default=os.environ.get("LOG_ROOT", ""), help="Optional exported log directory")
    args = parser.parse_args()

    OUT.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    indicator_lines = sorted(set(CONTENT_INDICATORS + PATH_INDICATORS))
    (OUT / "ioc-indicators.txt").write_text("\n".join(indicator_lines) + "\n")

    roots = list(args.roots)
    if args.log_root:
        roots.append(args.log_root)
    matches = _scan_roots(roots)
    if matches:
        (OUT / "ioc-scope-matches.txt").write_text("\n".join(matches) + "\n")
        print(f"[!] Found {len(matches)} IOC matches; details written under {OUT}")
        return 1
    print(f"[+] No IOC matches found; indicator inventory written under {OUT}")
    return 0

if __name__ == "__main__":
    try:
        sys.exit(main())
    except Exception as exc:
        print(f"[-] Execution failure: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
        sys.exit(2)

Hunt Manifest: trapdoor-cross-ecosystem-crypto-stealer-hunt-2

• Title: local repository and exported telemetry scope
• Question: Does the telemetry scope contain patterns associated with TrapDoor Cross-Ecosystem Crypto Stealer Campaign?
• Telemetry Family: file
• Telemetry Context: host filesystem or log export
• Positive Signal: Indicators of compromise matched in telemetry: local repository and exported telemetry scope

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Generic IOC scope scanner for trapdoor-cross-ecosystem-crypto-stealer.

Searches repository trees and exported logs for literal IOC values from iocs.json.
Exit codes:
  0: no matches
  1: one or more indicators matched
  2: execution error
"""
import argparse
import fnmatch
import os
import sys
from pathlib import Path

OUT = Path(os.environ.get("OUT", "hp-trapdoor-cross-ecosystem-crypto-stealer-ioc-scope"))
CONTENT_INDICATORS = [
  "env-loader-cli@0.1.0",
  "env-loader-cli@0.1.1",
  "eth-security-auditor@0.1.0",
  "sui-framework-helpers@0.1.0",
  "PyPI/env-loader-cli 0.1.0",
  "PyPI/env-loader-cli 0.1.1",
  "PyPI/eth-security-auditor 0.1.0",
  "Crates.io/sui-framework-helpers 0.1.0",
  "async-pipeline-builder@1.0.0",
  "build-scripts-utils@1.0.0",
  "chain-key-validator@1.0.0",
  "crypto-credential-scanner@1.0.0",
  "defi-env-auditor@1.0.0",
  "defi-threat-scanner@1.0.0",
  "deployment-key-auditor@1.0.0",
  "dev-env-bootstrapper@1.0.0",
  "eth-wallet-sentinel@1.0.0",
  "llm-context-compressor@1.0.0",
  "mnemonic-safety-check@1.0.0",
  "model-switch-router@1.0.0",
  "node-setup-helpers@1.0.0",
  "project-init-tools@1.0.0",
  "prompt-engineering-toolkit@1.0.0",
  "solidity-deploy-guard@1.0.0",
  "token-usage-tracker@1.0.0",
  "wallet-backup-verifier@1.0.0",
  "wallet-security-checker@1.0.0",
  "web3-secrets-detector@1.0.0",
  "workspace-config-loader@1.0.0",
  "cryptowallet-safety@1.0.0",
  "data-pipeline-check@1.0.0",
  "defi-risk-scanner@1.0.0",
  "git-config-sync@1.0.0",
  "solidity-build-guard@1.0.0",
  "move-analyzer-build@1.0.0",
  "move-compiler-tools@1.0.0",
  "move-project-builder@1.0.0",
  "sui-move-build-helper@1.0.0",
  "sui-sdk-build-utils@1.0.0",
  "ddjidd564.github.io",
  "https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/",
  "https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/config.json",
  "https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/payloads/compliance-scanner-light.js",
  "https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/payloads/risk-profiler.js",
  "npm -> node trap-core.js",
  "python -> node -e",
  "cargo -> build.rs",
  "developer or CI host egress to ddjidd564.github.io",
  "post-install GitHub or AWS credential validation",
  "env-loader-cli",
  "0.1.0",
  "0.1.1",
  "eth-security-auditor",
  "sui-framework-helpers",
  "PyPI/env-loader-cli",
  "PyPI/eth-security-auditor",
  "Crates.io/sui-framework-helpers",
  "async-pipeline-builder",
  "1.0.0",
  "build-scripts-utils",
  "chain-key-validator",
  "crypto-credential-scanner",
  "defi-env-auditor",
  "defi-threat-scanner",
  "deployment-key-auditor",
  "dev-env-bootstrapper",
  "eth-wallet-sentinel",
  "llm-context-compressor",
  "mnemonic-safety-check",
  "model-switch-router",
  "node-setup-helpers",
  "project-init-tools",
  "prompt-engineering-toolkit",
  "solidity-deploy-guard",
  "token-usage-tracker",
  "wallet-backup-verifier",
  "wallet-security-checker",
  "web3-secrets-detector",
  "workspace-config-loader",
  "cryptowallet-safety",
  "data-pipeline-check",
  "defi-risk-scanner",
  "git-config-sync",
  "solidity-build-guard",
  "move-analyzer-build",
  "move-compiler-tools",
  "move-project-builder",
  "sui-move-build-helper",
  "sui-sdk-build-utils"
]
PATH_INDICATORS = [
  "trap-core.js",
  ".cursorrules",
  "CLAUDE.md",
  "build.rs"
]
EXCLUDE_DIRS = {".git", "node_modules", "vendor", "dist", "build", ".venv", "__pycache__"}

def _iter_files(root):
    root = Path(root)
    if not root.exists():
        return
    if root.is_file():
        yield root
        return
    for current, dirs, files in os.walk(root):
        dirs[:] = [d for d in dirs if d not in EXCLUDE_DIRS]
        for name in files:
            yield Path(current) / name

def _path_matches(path):
    text = str(path)
    matches = []
    for indicator in PATH_INDICATORS:
        if not indicator:
            continue
        if indicator.startswith(("/", "~")):
            candidate = Path(os.path.expanduser(indicator))
            if candidate.exists() and path == candidate:
                matches.append(indicator)
        if indicator in text or fnmatch.fnmatch(text, indicator) or fnmatch.fnmatch(path.name, indicator):
            matches.append(indicator)
    return matches

def _content_matches(path):
    try:
        content = path.read_text(errors="ignore")
    except Exception:
        return []
    return [indicator for indicator in CONTENT_INDICATORS if indicator and indicator in content]

def _scan_roots(roots):
    matches = []
    for root in roots:
        if not root:
            continue
        for path in _iter_files(root):
            for indicator in _path_matches(path):
                matches.append(f"{path}: path matched {indicator!r}")
            for indicator in _content_matches(path):
                matches.append(f"{path}: content matched {indicator!r}")
    return matches

def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Scan files and logs for Halting Problems IOC values")
    parser.add_argument("roots", nargs="*", default=["."], help="File or directory roots to scan")
    parser.add_argument("--log-root", default=os.environ.get("LOG_ROOT", ""), help="Optional exported log directory")
    args = parser.parse_args()

    OUT.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    indicator_lines = sorted(set(CONTENT_INDICATORS + PATH_INDICATORS))
    (OUT / "ioc-indicators.txt").write_text("\n".join(indicator_lines) + "\n")

    roots = list(args.roots)
    if args.log_root:
        roots.append(args.log_root)
    matches = _scan_roots(roots)
    if matches:
        (OUT / "ioc-scope-matches.txt").write_text("\n".join(matches) + "\n")
        print(f"[!] Found {len(matches)} IOC matches; details written under {OUT}")
        return 1
    print(f"[+] No IOC matches found; indicator inventory written under {OUT}")
    return 0

if __name__ == "__main__":
    try:
        sys.exit(main())
    except Exception as exc:
        print(f"[-] Execution failure: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
        sys.exit(2)

Downstream Abuse Audits

Compromised workstations expose active API credentials, requiring immediate rotated revocation. The following platforms are at risk:

• GitHub OIDC and PATs: Attackers harvested SSH private keys and Git Personal Access Tokens. Auditors must inspect recent action runs and release logs during the exposure window.
• Cloud IAM Credentials: AWS, Azure, and GCP session tokens. CloudTrail and Activity Logs should be queried for AssumeRole or write operations originating from unexpected IP addresses.
• NPM and Package Registries: Publishing tokens and credentials. Registry profiles must be audited for unauthorized version publishes or token additions.

Sources

1. Socket: TrapDoor Crypto Stealer Supply Chain Attack Hits 34 Packages and Hundreds of Versions Across npm, PyPI, and Crates.io - Role: PRIMARY_RESEARCH - Impact: Campaign scope, package names, execution triggers, infrastructure, payload behavior, and IOCs.
2. OSV PyPI malicious-package list - Role: DIRECT_SOURCE - Impact: Recent PyPI malicious-package records associated with the campaign.
3. OSV MAL-2026-4272: env-loader-cli - Role: DIRECT_SOURCE - Impact: Affected versions, import-time exfiltration behavior, campaign label, and infrastructure IOCs.
4. GitHub: ddjidd564/defi-security-best-practices gh-pages - Role: DIRECT_SOURCE - Impact: Directly observable attacker-controlled infrastructure, payload directories, .cursorrules, and CLAUDE.md.
5. docs.rs: sui-framework-helpers 0.1.0 source - Role: DIRECT_SOURCE - Impact: Direct package source listing for a Crates.io package named in the campaign.